We present a model for the equilibrium movement of capital between markets. Markets with symmetrically distributed risks are distinguished only by the levels of capital invested in each. That market with the greater amount of capital earns lower conditional mean returns.
Introduction
We present a model for the equilibrium movement of capital between markets. Equilibrium conditional mean rates of return vary across markets according to the levels of capital invested in the respective markets. As a matter of supply and demand within each market, that market with the greater amount of capital earns lower conditional mean returns. Given a sufficient disparity in the capital levels in the markets, intermediaries find it optimal to search for investors in the market with "surplus" capital and offer them the opportunity to move their capital to the other market. An intermediary charges suppliers of capital a fee that is based on their gain from the move, and based on the degree of competition in the market for intermediation.
In equilibrium, the greater the relative difference in capital levels across the markets, the more intensive are intermediaries' efforts to re-balance the distribution of capital across the markers, and the greater the rate of convergence of the two mean rates of return toward a common level.
Our general objective, related to that of Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Gromb and Vayanos (2007) , is to characterize the dynamics of risk premia in a setting of imperfect capital mobility. In order to achieve analytical tractability, our model is highly stylized in several regards. Foremost among these, as in Gromb and Vayanos (2007) , some investors in each market are assumed to have no mobility.
An example is the limited mobility of capital into reinsurance markets, documented by Froot and O'Connell (1997) , who write: "Our results suggest that capital market imperfections are more important than shifts in actuarial valuation for understanding catastrophe reinsurance pricing. Supply, rather than demand, shifts seem to explain most features of the market in the aftermath of a loss." In subsequent work, Froot (2000) continues: "We . . . find the most compelling (evidence) to be supply restrictions associated with capital market imperfections and market power exerted by traditional reinsurers."
We are particularly interested in the impact of competition among intermediaries on the equilibrium degree of capital mobility. We suppose that intermediaries cannot commit to an intermediation policy that they would later find strictly suboptimal. In parametric versions of this setting, setting aside equilibria with cartel-like behavior, we show that the impact of competition among intermediaries is through two channels. First, intermediaries do not internalize the whole impact of their search activity on the entire market because they get only a fraction of the aggregate intermediation fees. This prompts intermediaries to search more as the number of intermediaries increases. Competition has a second and offsetting effect on capital mobility through the impact of fee bargaining on lower incentives to intermediate. In the simplest setting that we analyze, the second effect dominates: Increasing the number of intermediaries reduces capital mobility.
The Market Setting
This section presents a stylized model for the endogenous adjustment of capital and risk premia across markets. There are three types of agents: (i) local hedgers; (ii) speculators, who provide risk-bearing to hedgers in each of two local markets; and (iii) intermediaries (or asset managers) who provide the fee-based service of moving investors' capital from one market to the other. In equilibrium, speculators move their capital, subject to intermediation frictions, into that market with the higher premium for the same risk.
We fix a probability space (Ω, F , P ) and a common information filtration {F t : t ≥ 0} satisfying the usual conditions.
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In each of two financial markets, labeled a and b, a continuum (a non-atomic measure space) of local risk-averse agents own short-lived risky assets that they are willing to sell at or above their respective reservation prices. Equivalently, they are willing to buy insurance contracts against the risks to which they are exposed. These "hedgers" are not mobile across markets. They can be viewed in this respect as relatively unsophisticated in the use of cross-capital-market transactions, or as having high transactions costs for trading outside of their local markets. A continuum of speculators that supply capital have access to cross-market trading, subject to intermediation frictions to be described.
These suppliers of capital are risk-neutral, always offering to bear the risk that hedgers desire to shed in return for a risk premium. Because the total potential demand for risk bearing exceeds the immediately available supply of capital to bear it, there are strictly positive equilibrium risk premia. In an insurance context, one might think of these suppliers of capital as stylized versions of the "Names" that supply risk bearing capacity to the insurance market known as "Lloyd's of London."
The total levels of capital available in the two markets at time t are X at and X bt , respectively. Capital can be reinvested continually at the discretion of each provider of capital, that is, "rolled over" in the short-lived assets that are continually made available for sale by hedgers. Each unit of capital that is currently invested in market i at time t is paid cash dividends at the going market "reset rate" π(X it ), where π( · ) is a strictly decreasing continuous function. The payout rate π(X it ) is continually reset in auctions in which the supply and demand for the asset in market i are matched at each point in time. As the amount x of capital available to invest in the asset is increased, the reset rate declines. In the Appendix A, we provide an example in which π(x) is the equilibrium insurance premium in a market with x units of insurance capital.
In return for the payout rate π(X it ), the provider of each unit of capital in market i agrees to absorb the risky increments of a payoff process ρ i that is Lévy, that is, has independently and identically distributed increments over non-overlapping time periods of the same length.
(Examples include Brownian motions, Poisson processes, compound
Poisson processes, and linear combinations of these.) The idea is that the short-lived risky asset pays 1 + dρ it + π(X it ) dt at time t + dt per unit of capital invested at time t, in the instantaneous sense. More precisely, each unit of capital invested in market i at any time s, and rolled over continually, accumulates to W t units of capital by time t, where dW t = W t− dρ it , and in the meantime generates cash flows at the rate π(X it )W t . (The notation "W t− " means the left limit of the path of W at time t, that is, the level just before any jump at time t.)
In the case of an insurance contract, for example, we can take ρ i to be a compound Poisson process that jumps down at the arrival times of loss events, and is otherwise constant. In this case, one unit of capital invested at time t pays the supplier of capital 1 + π(X it ) dt at time t + dt (in the above sense) if there is no loss event, and if there is a loss event, has a recovery value of 1 + ∆ρ it , where ∆ρ it is the jump size. The jumps of ρ i are bounded below by −1, preserving limited liability. If the loss events have mean arrival rate η and a loss-size distribution ν with mean ν, then the mean loss rate is ην.
In this case, as the amount x of capital gets large, the market clearing payout rate π(x) cannot go below ην + r, where r > 0 is the time preference rate of the investors. Suppliers of capital optimally supply all of their local capital inelastically, so long as the mean rate of return π(x) − ην is strictly larger than their common time preference rate r.
In order to solve for simple examples of equilibrium capital dynamics, we will later pick parametric examples for π(x), constructing the cross-sectional distribution of hedgers' preferences so as to support these examples.
As with typical asset-management contracts used by hedge funds and private-equity partnerships, cash payouts are not re-invested into the capital pool. For us, this is merely a modeling convenience.
We assume that ρ i = ǫ i + ǫ c , where the market-specific processes ǫ a and ǫ b , and the common component ǫ c , are independent Lévy processes. We assume throughout that ǫ a and ǫ b have the same distribution, so that the two markets have identically and symmetrically distributed risks. This symmetry simplifies the calculation of an equilibrium and has the further illustrative advantage that any differences in the conditional expected returns in the two markets are due solely to differences in the capital levels of the markets.
Without capital-market frictions, suppliers of capital would move capital between the markets so as to obtain the higher reset rate, and by virtue of their common capital movements would equate the reset rates π(X at ) and π(X bt ) in equilibrium, and thereby equate X at and X bt at all times. Indeed, given the symmetrically distributed returns of the two markets, the suppliers of capital would do so even if they were risk-averse, provided that they have no other hedging motives.
Frictions in the movement of capital may, however, lead to unequal levels of capital in the two markets. If, for example, X at < X bt , then the conditional excess mean rate of return of the risky asset in market a exceeds that in market b by π(X at ) − π(X bt ), despite the identical idiosyncratic and systematic risks of the two assets. Whichever market has "too much capital" receives the lower risk premium.
A supplier of capital decides only how to deploy re-invested capital between the two markets, subject to the available trading technology. Letting C t denote the net cumulative amount of capital moved by that supplier of capital from market a into market b through time t, the supplier's levels of capital, W C at in market a and W C bt in market b, jointly satisfy
Capital can be moved only through the services of an intermediary, and at the times of contact with an intermediary, as will be explained. A model for a proportional transactions-fee process K will be determined in equilibrium, once we have introduced a model for intermediation of capital movements. A supplier of capital is infinitely-lived and discounts net cash flow at a given rate r, so has a utility of
A minor alteration of the model for randomly timed exit and entrance of capital suppliers would be equally tractable.
2 For simplicity, we have assumed that transactions costs are paid directly by suppliers of capital, and not deducted from the capital moved from market to market.
Each supplier of capital takes as given the total capital processes X a and X b of the respective markets as well as the proportional transactions-cost process K. Among other equilibrium consistency conditions, suppliers of capital form consistent conjectures regarding the dynamics of (X a , X b , K).
Intermediaries contact suppliers of capital in order to profit from fees for moving their capital from one market to another. In equilibrium, at any time, only suppliers of capital in that market with greater capital agree to have any of their capital moved to the other market. Because a supplier of capital has linear preferences and takes (X a , X b , K) as given, it is optimal when contacted to move either no capital or to move all capital to the other market. If he or she has any capital in the market with more total capital, then all of this investor's capital will be moved, provided the proportional transaction-costs process K is not too large, and this is the case in any equilibrium for our model, as we shall see once the model is completely specified. Thus, although we allow that a given supplier of capital may initially have non-zero capital in both markets, all of his or her invested capital will optimally be held in just one of the two markets at any time after the first time of contact with an intermediary.
We let W ij (t) denote the level of capital in market i of investor j at time t. Conditional on the intermediation contact intensity process λ, suppliers of capital are individually contacted, pairwise independently. In a manner similar to that of Weill (2007) , the law of large numbers allows us to calculate the aggregate rate of movement of capital. Letting m( · ) denote the non-atomic measure over the space of suppliers of capital, the total rate at which capital is moved from market a to market b is almost surely
Likewise, the rate at which capital moves from market b to market a is λ t 1 {X bt > Xat} X bt .
Given the total market intermediation contact intensity process λ and initial conditions for capital in each market, we let X λ it denote the total capital in market i at time t. Given an associated transaction-cost process K, the marginal value to a supplier of one additional unit of capital in market i at time t is
where, for each s, N s is the cumulative number of switches back and forth between the two markets through time s by the holder of this unit of capital, and the market indicator D(s) is a or b, depending on whether, at time s, the associated accumulated capital W s is currently located in market a or b. The unit of capital thus accumulates according to
with initial condition W t = 1. The market-indicator process D is a marked point process with an initial condition at time t of D(t) = i, and with an intensity of jumping from market i to market j at time s of λ s 1 {X λ is >X λ js } . In the equilibrium that we shall describe, the value of switching from market i to market j is strictly positive if and only if X λ it > X λ jt . In general, the marginal switching value is
We assume that, at each time t, intermediaries charge suppliers of capital some fraction q ∈ [0, 1] of the gain φ λ t from switching each unit of capital. That is, the proportional intermediation fee is K λ t = qφ λ t . One can view q as the bargaining power of an intermediary. We later discuss the impact of intermediary competition on q.
To assume that a supplier of capital can move capital from one market to another only through intermediation is tantamount to an assumption that the alternative technologies for moving capital are prohibitively expensive. For this, it would be enough, in equilibrium, that for any alternative trading technology such as directly contacting and negotiating with hedgers, the proportional cost of moving capital exceeds the marginal value φ λ t of switching. This is a strong assumption that simplifies the model and its solution. We will calculate the marginal switching value in examples and show that it can be arbitrarily small depending on the parameters of the intermediation technology.
So, the assumption that alternative capital movement technologies would not be used by suppliers of capital is reasonable in some circumstances.
Our model can also be generalized by supposing that each supplier of capital has an alternative technology by which opportunities to move capital to the other market arrive at random times, independent across suppliers of capital, with a constant mean arrival rate. This would cause only minor modifications to the structure and solution of our model. We avoid it for simplicity. Obviously, the higher the mean arrival rates of these alternative capital-shifting opportunities, the less the average degree of imbalance of capital and condtional mean asset returns between the two markets, and the smaller the profitability of intermediation. An intermediary's rate of cost for applying contact intensity λ t is assumed to be cλ t , for some technological coefficient c ≥ 0. For example, doubling the expected rate at which capital suppliers are contacted costs twice as much. 4 We restrict λ to be a progressively-measurable process so that, at each time, the contact intensity can depend only on currently available information. The maximum feasible contact intensity of the market is assumed to be some λ ∈ (0 , ∞).
We will solve the model separately for a monopolistic intermediary, for a finite number n of identical oligopolistic intermediaries, and for perfectly competitive intermediaries.
Given the inverse-demand function π( · ), which as explained in Appendix A can be engineered from primitive assumptions on the distribution of risk preferences of hedgers, the model is defined by (π, ρ a , ρ b , r, q, c, λ, n).
Equilibrium with Monopolistic Intermediation
We focus first on the monopolistic case, n = 1. In the next section, the solution of the monopolistic case leads immediately to a solution for the oligopolistic case via a simple equivalence result.
The monopolist's problem
A monopolistic intermediary's total rate of fee revenue is λ t max(X at , X bt )qφ λ t . This assumes that the intermediary and supplier of capital both correctly anticipate that the intermediary's future contact intensity is indeed given by the process λ. We will later impose this consistency property as part of the definition of an equilibrium.
Given the initial conditions X λ a0 = x a and X λ b0 = x b , the intermediary's utility for a contact intensity process λ is
We assume that the parameters are such that this utility is finite, which is the case
in the equilibria that we analyze. We restrict attention to intermediation policies that depend only on the current capital levels (X at , X bt ). The intermediary might otherwise prefer to commit once and for all time to a path-dependent intensity policy that could, at some future time, be dominated by another policy available at that time, given the current capital market conditions at that time.
The inability to commit to an intermediation strategy may in principle be overcome by sophisticated punishment threats, as in Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) and Mailath and Samuelson (2006) . In such equilibria, if the intermediary deviates, investors would update their beliefs about the intermediary's strategy in a way that harms the intermediary. Such equilibria are based on sophisticated off-equilibrium-path investor beliefs, which are not in the spirit of our assumption that investors are less sophisticated than intermediaries.
Another possible justification for our focus on Markov equilibria is the fact that more sophisticated equilibria unravel in finite-horizon models where (possibly state-dependent)
stage games have a unique Nash equilibrium.
Given the symmetry of the two markets, it suffices to characterize equilibrium behavior in terms of
The payoff processes to investments in the "larger" and "smaller" markets are, respectively,
From the Lévy property, (ρ X , ρ Y ) has the same joint distribution as the primitive payoff processes (ρ a , ρ b ).
Because we restrict attention to an intermediation intensity process λ that depends only on current capital levels, and because of symmetry, we can suppose that λ t = Λ(X t , Y t ) for some measurable policy function Λ : R 2 + → [0, λ] with the property that there is a solution to the associated stochastic differential equation
Letting L denote the space of intermediation intensity processes of this form, the intermediary's value is
An equilibrium is an intermediation intensity process that attains the supremum (6).
This definition includes consistency with the optimality for suppliers of capital to move their capital, in exchange for the stipulated fee, when contacted by the intermediary, and includes consistency between the conjectured and actual dynamics for capital movements and search intensity.
Homogeneous Case
In order to obtain the simplification associated with homogeneity, we suppose that the inverse demand function π( · ) is of the form a + kx −γ for positive constants a, k, and γ.
As explained in the insurance setting of Appendix A, this can be arranged by suitable assumptions on the cross-sectional distribution of hedgers' dis-utilities for insurance premia and losses. Because the constant a is common to the two markets, it has no effect on benefits to switching capital, and can be taken to be zero without loss of generality.
Without loss of generality, we can take k = 1 by re-scaling. That is, the solution of the intermediary for coefficients (k, c) is the same as the solution for (1, c/k). Because the intermediary has linear time-additive preferences and because of the homogeneity of π, and therefore of φ λ , the ratio Z = X/Y of total capital in the over-capitalized market to total capital in the under-capitalized market determines the optimal intermediation intensity. Thus, we can assume the independence of ρ a and ρ b without loss of generality because any common Lévy component would have no effect on the ratio of X to Y . (The sole exception is a case of common jumps with a jump-size distribution that supports −1, in which case there is a non-zero probability that X t and Y t can be zero simultaneously.
We rule out this exception.)
Consistent with the insurance example, we suppose that ρ a and ρ b are of the form
where µ is a constant and ǫ a and ǫ b are independent compound Poisson processes with common jump intensity η and a given jump-size probability distribution ν. The proportional payoff processes processes ρ a and ρ b could also be given a common Brownian component without affecting our analysis, for this also has no effect on the relative proportions of capital in the two markets. Cases with market-specific Brownian components are analyzed in Appendix K. Likewise, the constant drift rate µ plays no role in the analysis of optimal intermediation, and can be taken to be zero without loss of generality for purposes of determining equilibrium intermediation policies. The effect of non-zero µ on actual capital levels can be reintroduced later with the scaling by e µt of both X t and Y t .
We begin our analysis with the simple case in which the jump-size distribution ν places all mass at −1, meaning complete loss of invested capital at an event. We later relax this to random partial recovery, for which we offer an illustrative numerical example. For the zero-recovery case, a loss event in the market with less capital would cause the capital ratio X t /Y t to jump to +∞. While we allow this formally, the analysis can be done similarly in terms of the ratio Y t /X t , which remains in [0, 1] almost surely, and our results apply with only notational changes. Provided the initial conditions include a strictly positive amount of capital in at least one market, the probability that X t and Y t ever reach zero at the same time is 0. The partial-recovery case that we later consider, for which the jump size distribution places zero probability on −1, has strictly positive capital levels in both markets at all times after time zero, given a strictly positive level of capital in at least one of the markets at time zero.
Let G(X t , Y t ) and H(X t , Y t ) denote the present values to suppliers of capital of the marginal future cash flows per unit of capital held at time t in the over-capitalized and under-capitalized markets, respectively, according to (3). Subject to the usual smoothness and integrability conditions, Itô's formula implies that these functions satisfy the coupled
When moving a unit of capital, the intermediary gets a fraction q of the investor's gain to switching capital from one market to the other, which is
The intermediary's value function is the supremum utility of admissible policies.
We assume that V (x, y) is finite, which is the case in the equilibria that we analyze.
The Bellman Equation
This is not a traditional stochastic control problem, in that the running reward to the intermediary includes a role for the assumed gain
which is a present value that depends on the intermediation policy function Λ itself. This leads to an additional optimality consistency condition that we will show our solution satisfies. For an arbitrary intermediation policy function Γ, the associated Hamilton-
Proposition 1 Given an intermediation policy Γ, suppose thatV is a bounded differentiable function satisfying the HJB equation (9). Then, for any intermediation intensity
Let Λ be an admissible policy such that, for each (x, y), Λ(x, y) attains the supremum (9).
Thus, for any intermediation intensity process λ,
That is, given the switching-gain function F Γ associated with a candidate policy Γ, it is optimal for the intermediary to adopt the policy Λ for contacting providers of capital.
(Indeed, given F Γ , λ * is optimal among even non-Markovian intensity policies.) If, moreover, Λ = Γ and if there is no other policy with this fixed-point property, then Λ is the unique optimal policy.
The proof is by a traditional martingale verification argument given in Appendix B.
We will show that the assumption thatV is bounded and differentiable is satisfied by the candidate value function for our main parametric example with γ = 1. Thus, the proposition implies that the HJB equation characterizes optimality in this setting.
The homogeneity of π implies that H and G are homogeneous of degree −γ. As
we can recover F Λ from the solution f of the ordinary differential equation
The relevant boundary condition is f (1) = 0, corresponding to no gain from switching when the two markets have the same capital levels.
We now check that f is nonnegative. We can rewrite (12) as
Because the righthand side is strictly positive, f or f ′ must be strictly positive. This implies that f cannot cross 0 from above. Hence, f must be positive on some interval of the form (z, ∞) and non-positive on [1, z] for some level z. It remains to show that z = 1.
Because f (1) = 0, this implies that the intermediary does not search at this level (since
vanishes on a neighborhood of 1. From (13), this implies that f is positive on that neighborhood, which concludes a proof of the following result.
Proposition 2 Given any intermediation policy Λ, f (z) is strictly positive for z > 1.
That is, suppliers of capital in the over-capitalized market optimally accept the offer to move all of their capital out of the over-capitalized market whenever given the opportunity.
Trigger Intermediation Solution
We now solve for the equilibrium intermediation policy for the special case in which π(x) = a + k/x. As we have explained, we can take a = 0 and k = 1 without loss of generality. In this case, F is homogeneous of degree −1 and V is homogeneous of degree 0. That is, V (x, y) = V (x/y, 1) for y > 0. In particular, given the function f determining intermediation fees, the policy Λ achieving the supremum of the HJB equation (9) must be also be homogeneous of degree 0; that is, Λ(x, y) = L(x/y) for some function L. Because the switching-gain function f depends on the policy function L, we have a fixed point problem: Find a pair (f, L) such that: (i) given f , L represents the intermediary's optimal policy, and (ii) given L, the function f is that determined by (12). Moreover, among those pairs (f, L) satisfying these two conditions, an equilibrium L must correspond to maximal intermediation utility.
In Appendix E (Proposition 7), we show that any such equilibrium must be of the "bang-bang" form
Λ(x, y) = λ, x ≥ T y,
for some trigger ratio T ≥ 1 of the capital level in the over-capitalized market to the capital level in the under-capitalized market. This is intuitive: The objective function defined by the HJB equation is linear with respect to the intermediation intensity level, so we anticipate the optimal policy to switch from minimal to maximal intensity when there is sufficient marginal gain from moving capital from one market to the other. This occurs when the ratio of the two capital levels is sufficiently high. Such a trigger policy is illustrated in Figure 1 .
Our problem is reduced to finding the optimal trigger ratio T , which then completely determines equilibrium behavior.
In order to determine the constant g 0 , we note that for any initial capital levels x and y,
is the present value R(x, y) of the total future cash flows at rate X t π(X t ) + Y t π(Y t ), to be divided among the intermediaries and the suppliers of capital, net of the present value P T (x, y) of the intermediary's expected discounted search costs over the infinite horizon, given trigger T . That is,
Because of the homogeneity of π of degree −1, we have R(x, y) = 2/r. The searchcost present value P T (1, 0) solves the equation
where p is present value of search costs from time zero to the exponentially distributed time τ of the next loss event. From a calculation given in Appendix C,
where a(T ) = log(1 + 1/T )/λ. We therefore have
The equation (12) for f reduces to
and
For z ∈ [1, T ], the solution is trivial:
In particular, we verify that f (1) = 0, consistent with the observation that the net present value of moving capital from one market to the other is 0 when the levels of capital in the two markets are the same.
We can re-write (18) as
where a = (r + 2η + (1 − q)λ)/λ and b = (1 + ηg 0 )/λ.
Letting v(z) = V (z, 1), the HJB equation reduces to 0 = sup
where
where κ = (r + 2η)/λ and d = (2ηv 0 − cλ)/λ.
In Appendix D, we prove the following result.
Proposition 3 For any trigger T , the solution v of (22)- (24) is bounded, nondecreasing, and strictly increasing on [T, ∞).
Combining (24), the equation obtained by differentiating (24), as well as the equation (21) for f , yields the second-order linear ordinary differential equation for v:
where α = (a−1)κ, β = (a+κ), ω = d(a−1)−qb, and δ = qb. We bear in mind that some of the coefficients of this equation depend on a constant to be determined, v 0 = V (1, 0).
The smooth-pasting condition v ′ (T ) = 0 implies the trigger capital ratio
A proof of the following results guaranteeing existence and uniqueness of a trigger strategy is found in Appendix G.
Proposition 4 (Uniqueness) There exists a unique trigger capitalization ratio T satisfying (17), (18), (19), and (26).
This analysis leads to the following characterization of optimality, which includes the result that in the absence of search costs, the intermediary does not exploit his position to restrict movement of capital, but rather provides maximal intermediation, nevertheless generating fee income from his or her imperfect ability to instantaneously move capital from one market to the other due to the upper bound λ on contact intensity.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the payout-rate function π( · ) is a constant plus a function that is homogeneous of degree −1. Then there exists a unique equilibrium (f, λ). In this equilibrium, the intermediary has a unique optimal intermediation policy λ. This policy is inactive (λ t = 0) whenever the ratio of capital levels in the two markets is between 1/T and T , and is otherwise at full capacity (λ t = λ). The uniquely determined trigger ratio T is given by (26), where the constant g 0 is given by (17). If there is no intermediation cost (c = 0), then the intermediary always works at full capacity (that is, T = 1).
Relation (26) also provides an upper bound on the equilibrium capital-ratio trigger level:
This bound is useful for computing numerical solutions to the optimization problem. An algorithm for computing the constant g 0 , and thus T , is given in Appendix H.
Partial Recovery
We now allow the jump-size distribution ν of the payoff process ρ i to be distributed on (0, 1), the case of partial recovery from a loss event.
Subject to the usual smoothness and integrability conditions, Itô's formula and the definition (3) of the value of a unit of capital held in market i imply that the value functions G and H satisfy the following coupled equations, taking 1 − W to be a random variable with the proportional event-loss probability distribution ν:
In Appendix I, our analyses of the HJB equation and smooth-fit condition are extended from the case of zero recovery to this partial-recovery setting, and a solution algorithm is given. The solution algorithm exploits the linearity of the differential equations for g, h,
and v, which arises thanks to the special structure of our problem.
Numerical Illustration
We provide an illustrative example of equilibrium for the case of partial recovery. We take the parameters r = 0.04, η = 1.5, c = 0.04, λ = 0.1, q = 1/30, and beta distributed recovery on (0, 1) with parameters (5, 1). The equilibrium intermediation trigger ratio T of capital in the over-capitalized market to capital in the under-capitalized market is found numerically to be 1.465. 
Intermediary Competition
We now provide solutions for equilibria with oligopolistic or perfectly competitive markets for intermediation.
There are two channels through which the degree of intermediary competition might affect the equilibrium level of intermediation offered by the market. First, a large intermediary internalizes the impact of intermediation intensity on the heterogeneity of capital levels across the two markets, and thus the degree to which there are gains from trade to outside investors. The more intensive the intermediation policy, the lower are the potential future gains from trade to be split with an investor moving capital. Second, when in contact with an investor, an intermediary considers the ability of the investor to compare the intermediation fee offered with the fees offered by other intermediaries. This plays a role in determining the effective bargaining power of the intermediary, and through that channel, the impact on the profitability of intermediation. We will examine the effects of both channels, and start by taking bargaining power as fixed.
Intermediary competition at fixed bargaining power
For a given bargaining power q, equilibrium trigger policies for the oligopolistic case can be translated directly from the case of monopolistic intermediation, by a change of variables.
The solution is even simpler with perfectly competitive intermediaries, because they do not internalize any impact of their own intermediation intensity on the market dynamics.
For the oligopolistic case, we take n identical intermediaries, each with an upper bound λ/n on intermediation intensity, and with the same proportional cost c of intermediation.
The monopolistic case (n = 1) is the special case considered in the previous section. 
Cross-market capital ratio z For the case of perfectly competitive intermediation, we take "n = ∞" by considering a non-atomic measure space of intermediaries of total mass 1. Each intermediary in this continuum has maximal intermediation intensity λ, again providing for a marketwide total intermediation capacity of λ. Thus, all cases have the same feasible market dynamics and costs.
We again consider only Markov equilibria. As opposed to the monopolistic case, however, these need not be the only form of no-commitment equilibria. There might exist equilibria with "punishment phases" involving path-dependent variation of intermediation intensities. Such cartel-like behavior is ruled out by restricting attention to Markov equilibria. Equilibrium incorporates the degree to which intermediaries internalize the impact of their intermediation intensity on the heterogeneity of capital levels across markets.
For an oligopolistic equilibrium in trigger strategies, each of the n intermediaries has a reduced value function v, with v(z) = V (z, 1), solving the reduced HJB equation
where v 0 = V (y, 0) = V (x, 0). This HJB equation reflects the presumption by the given intermediary that the n − 1 other intermediaries have adopted a specific trigger level T . The equilibrium condition is that the same trigger policy is optimal for the given intermediary. Verification of the HJB solution as the value function is as for the monopolistic case.
The HJB equation is solved by
From this reduced HJB equation, we see that an intermediary's optimization problem in a setting with n intermediaries, effort cost coefficient c, payout rate scaling k, and aggregate search capacityλ is equivalent to that of a monopolistic setting in which the intermediary has cost coefficient c/n, payout rate scaling k/n, and search capacity λ/n.
For example, the effect of doubling the number of intermediaries on improving capital mobility is precisely offset by halving the cost of intermediation and halving the asset payout rate to suppliers of capital. In particular, no further analysis is required, for we can translate the solution that we have already obtained for the monopolistic case n = 1 to the case of any number of intermediaries.
Thus, an equilibrium for the n-intermediary problem is again given by bang-bang control for all intermediaries, each exerting no effort when Z t < T and maximal intermediation intensity λ/n whenever Z t ≥ T , for a trigger capital-ratio T . The smooth-pasting condition v ′ (T ) = 0 implies the trigger capital ratio
where g 0,n = G(1, 0; n) denotes the solution corresponding to the monopolistic case, for cost parameter c/n, asset payout rate π(x) = a + kx/n, and search capacityλ/n. We indicate the dependence of the equilibrium intermediation trigger on n, c, and k by writing T (n,λ, c, k). We have
More can be said. As observed in Section 3.2, T (1, λ, c, k) is homogeneous of degree zero in (c, k). This fact and the observation of the previous paragraph imply that
In words, the equilibrium threshold depends on the number n of intermediaries only through the effect on individual search capacityλ/n.
Proposition 6 For a given bargaining power q, the equilibrium capital ratio trigger T for each of n intermediaries with aggregate maximum search intensity λ is that of a monopolist intermediary with maximum search intensity λ/n.
One can interpret the result as follows. An intermediary stops searching when the immediate net benefit of doing so (per dollar switched), qzf (z) − c, drops below the marginal value z(1+z)v ′ (z) associated with future capital heterogeneity caused by moving capital. For a given trigger ratio T , an intermediary's value function v declines in direct proportion to the number n of intermediaries, and, hence, so does the derivative v ′ .
This implies that the term z(1 + z)v ′ (z) diminishes with n, while the immediate marginal benefit qzf (z)−c is unchanged, keeping T constant. Thus, as n increases, the incentive to search at the given trigger ratio T becomes strictly positive, prompting intermediaries to search more. As n goes to infinity, an intermediary's value function goes to zero (because the pie to be shared among intemediaries is uniformly bounded above by 2k/r), and the derivative v ′ (T ) also goes to 0. The limit as n diverges is the competitive equilibrium, in which the trigger capital ratio T is determined by qT f (T ) − c = 0.
With perfect competition, an intermediary has no impact on aggregate search activity, and thus cares only about the immediate net benefit from switching. When there is zero recovery from a loss event, the after-event heterogeneity (which is infinite) does not depend of the pre-event heterogeneity. In that case, intermediaries already ignore the impact of their search activity on heterogeneity and the monopolistic solution coincides with the competitive one.
Competition for intermediation, does, however, play a role through the sharing of gains from trade when in contact with an investor. So far, we have taken the fraction q of gains that are allocated to intermediaries to be fixed. We next consider the implications of market structure for the determination of q.
Endogenous bargaining power
For n > 1 intermediaries, we suppose that some fraction ψ n of investors are "well connected," meaning that as they prepare to switch capital from one market to another, they are in simultaneous contact with more than one intermediary. The number of intermediaries with whom a given investor is in contact could also be random, exploiting the law of large numbers, in which case ψ n can be taken to be the probability that an investor, when contacted, is in contact with more than one intermediary. Intuitively, a well-connected investor has more bargaining power than a "captive" investor, one who is in contact with only one intermediary.
There are alternatives for modeling the resulting bargaining game. One issue is whether a contacted intermediary is assumed to know whether the investor is in contact with other intermediaries. We will take this case. 5 Another modeling approach is a multilateral bargaining game with complete information, as in Stole and Zwiebel (1996) .
The Shapley value from such a bargaining game is identical to that of the solution below.
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We consider a bargaining procedureà la Rubinstein (1982) , in which the investor and a particular intermediary alternate offers. In our continuous-time setting, the time between offer rounds can be treated as arbitrarily small, so the inter-round discount factor can be 5 It would be possible to allow for one-sided information. The fees derived could be obtained as equilibrium outcomes of a bargaining process, although there may be additional equilibria. See, for example, Sutton (1986) . For an alternative approach to treating uncertainty about the degree to which an intermediary's customer is in contact with other intermediaries, see Green (2007) . 6 In that case, the payoff of an intermediary is zero whenever at least two intermediaries take part to the bargaining process, since the surplus that can be achieved from any coalition is independent of the number of intermediaries, provided that number is nonzero.
taken to be 1. In that case, the investor and intermediary agree immediately to split the surplus according to the Nash bargaining solution. The investor's share depends on his outside option. If the investor is captive, his outside option is simply g(z), the value of remaining in the over-capitalized market. Thus, the Nash product associated with a fee of s is
which is maximal at s = f (z)/2, corresponding to q = 1/2, meaning an equal splitting of the gains with the intermediary.
For a well-connected investor, the Nash product is
where q 0 is the conjectured proportion of the gain from trade that the investor would pay to another intermediary if this first round of bargaining were to break down. The Nash product is maximized at s = 0, for a proportional intermediary share of q = 0, corresponding to the extraction of all surplus by the well-connected investor.
If the number of intermediaries in contact with the investor is known only by the investor, then q is similarly obtained, and depends on the probability that the investor is captive.
The average of an intermediary's share of gains across the population of investors is
In particular, q * (n) is decreasing in n if ψ n is increasing in n. Obviously, ψ 2 ≥ ψ 1 . It is somewhat intuitive that an investor is more likely to be well connected as the number of intermediaries increases. Appendix L briefly outlines a model with this natural feature.
Lowering q reduces an intermediary's incentive to search, all else equal, because, for given capital dynamics, lowering q reduces intermediation profits, and therefore the marginal benefit of raising intermediation intensity. This comparative static result holds, even after equilibrium adjustments, for the numerical examples that we have considered.
More competitive intermediation, in this sense, reduces search activity.
Discussion
This paper is motivated by empirical evidence that supply or demand shocks in asset markets, in addition to causing an immediate price response, also lead to adjustments over time in the distribution of capital across markets and adjustments over time in relative conditional mean asset returns, in a way that reflects delays in the adjustments of investors' portfolios.
With trading frictions that delay portfolio adjustments, there can be periods of time over which assets with identical risks have different mean returns. More generally, there can be differences in mean returns across assets that are due not only to cross-sectional differences in "fundamental" cash-flow risks, but are also due to the degree to which the distribution of asset holdings across investors is inefficient (relative to a market without intermediation frictions). Empirical "factor" models of asset returns do not often account for factors related to the distribution of ownership of assets, or related to likely changes in the distribution of ownership.
We have examined a simple setting in which, absent trading frictions, investors would adjust their portfolios so as to achieve the highest possible mean return for a given risk, thereby equating mean returns across assets. Because of trading frictions, however, investors cannot instantaneously adjust their portfolios. Over time, investors make portfolio adjustments that cause mean returns across markets to revert toward each other, until the next supply shock occurs. In our analysis, capital is mobilized through optimal intermediation. Other market microstructures would, however, lead to similar patterns of adjustment of capital and mean returns.
For example, in corporate bond markets, one observes large price drops and delayed price recovery in connection with major downgrades or defaults, as described by Hradsky and Long (1989) In all of these examples, the time pattern of returns or prices after a supply or demand shock reveals that the friction at work is not merely a transaction cost for trade. If that were the nature of the friction, then all investors would immediately adjust their portfolios, or not, optimally, and the new market price and expected return would be immediately established, and remain constant until the next change in fundamentals. In all of the above examples, however, after the immediate price response, whose magnitude reflects the size of the shock and the degree of short-term price elasticity, there is a relatively lengthy period of time over which the price recovers reverts in mean toward its new fundamental level. In the meantime, of course, additional shocks can occur, with overlapping consequences. The typical pattern suggests that the initial price response is larger than would occur with perfect capital mobility, and reflects the demand curve of the limited pool of investors that are quickly available to absorb the shock. The speed of adjustment after the initial price response is a reflection of the time that it takes more investors to realign their portfolios in light of the new market conditions, or for the initially responding investors to gather more capital.
In our model, delays in portfolio adjustments are due to the time that it takes for intermediaries to locate suitable suppliers of capital. This is only an abstraction, of course, but it may proxy for other delays, including time to educate investors about assets with which they have limited familiarity, time for contracting, and time for investors to dispose of their current positions, which could involve similar delays and price shocks, as suggested by Chaiserote (2008) . Some of the delays in practice could be due to time for information about investment opportunities to percolate through the population of suitable investors. Incorporating informational differences in our model would, however, involve substantial complications.
There is already a significant body of theory dealing with the implications of search frictions for asset pricing. For example, the implications of differences in search frictions across different asset markets are treated by Weill (2008) and Vayanos and Wang (2007) . Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2005) study the implications of search frictions in a single asset market with marketmaking. In the context of a single asset market, Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2007) and Lagos, Rocheteau, and Weil (2008) model recoveries in mean returns, after a shock to the preferences of investors, that are caused by a gradual re-allocation of the asset to more suitable investors, rather than by cross-market capital dynamics as here. Earlier search-based models of intermediation include Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) , Bhattacharya and Hagerty (1987) , Moresi (1991) , Gehrig (1993) , and Yavaş (1996) .
Related work on the implications of capital market frictions for asset pricing dynamics includes Basak and Croitoru (2000) and He and Krishnamurthy (2007) .
In terms of general objectives and some model features, the study by Gromb and Vayanos (2007) is closely related to ours. Our respective approaches were developed independently. Common to the models in these two studies, certain local classes of investors are completely immobile, while arbitrageurs can work across markets driving returns toward fundamental levels, subject to frictions that prevent them from perfectly equating returns in the two markets. In Gromb and Vayanos (2007) , the shock that initially drives a wedge between the prices of the assets in the two markets is a change in the direction of hedging demands of local investors. In our model, the shock is a loss in capital in one of the markets, relative to the other, due to an adverse realized asset return in one of the markets. The friction in Gromb and Vayanos (2007) is that arbitrageurs' positions must be collateralized, combined with a rule that prohibits the use of the asset from one of the markets as collateral against losses in the asset of other market. In our study, the friction is costly and delay inducing intermediation. We focus on the implications of optimal intermediation, under rational conjectures of future optimal intermediation efforts, for current and future asset returns, and for intermediation pricing.
In our model, investors who contemplate moving their capital to the other market consider the likelihood that future shocks will at some point cause them to wish to move capital from the other market back to their current market, and the likelihood of delays in doing so, thereby lowering the value of switching to the other market in the first place. The net gain to the investor is shared with an intermediary, providing an incentive for faster intermediation when capital is deployed less evenly across markets.
Appendices

A An Insurance Example
We illustrate the model with an example motivated by catastrophe insurance contracts.
In a particular market, at each of the event times of a Poisson process J with a constant intensity η, a catastrophe occurs that causes losses throughout a population of consumers who are potential buyers of protection. Each of a continuum of consumers in the given insurance market has a property that experiences a loss at each catastrophe event. The losses of the consumers at a given event are identically and symmetrically distributed.
The distribution of consumer losses at each catastrophe has the property that if a quantity
x of the consumers have bought insurance at the time of the i-th catastrophe, then total claims of xζ i are paid by sellers of protection, where ζ 1 , ζ 2 , . . . is a sequence of independent random variables, identically distributed on [0, 1], and independent of J. For this, it need not be the case that the damage of a particular consumer at the i-th event is equal to the average damage rate ζ i , but we will assume so for notational simplicity only.
Each consumer chooses to be insured, or not, at each point in time, based on information available up to that time, but of course not including the information about loss events at precisely that time. 7 Whenever insured, the consumer pays premiums at the current rate p t in his or her market, and is covered against damages in the event of a loss.
Consumer α in a particular market has an insurance purchase policy process δ, valued in 7 The appropriate measurability restriction is "predictability."
{0, 1}, providing total expected dis-utility of
where τ i is the time of the i-th catastrophe, β is a discount rate, and u 1α ( · ) and u 2α ( · ) are strictly decreasing dis-utility functions.
Given the additive nature of this utility, the insurance purchase policy δ minimizes total lifetime dis-utility if and only if, almost everywhere, δ t solves, time by time, the insurance purchase decision
This problem is solved by 0 or 1 depending on whether p t is greater or less than some reservation price p α . We can therefore calculate, for each premium level p, the total demand χ(p) = M ({α : p α ≤ p}) for insurance, where M( · ) is the measure on the space A of consumers in the market. 8 Associated with the strictly decreasing demand function χ, assuming continuity, is a strictly decreasing and continuous inverse demand function, which we can express as π( · ) + ηE(ζ i ), where π(x) is the premium above expected loss.
Alternative approaches, for example partial coverage, could be used to model the inverse demand funtion. In the end, to achieve a tractable solution of the intermediary's problem, we will make parametric assumptions for π( · ) that can be justified by suitable construction of u 1α , u 2α , and the measure M.
The cumulative insurance claims process L for a quantity of one unit of insurance sold at all times is the compound Poisson is defined by L t = J(t) i=1 ζ i . In order to offer one unit of insurance in a particular market, a seller of protection is required to commit one unit of capital. This is natural if one requires (say, as a regulatory matter) that insurance is default free, under the assumption that the essential supremum of the fractional event loss ζ i is 1, which is the case in our illustrative numerical examples. (In any case, this supremum loss can be taken to be 1 without loss of generality by normalization of the definition of one unit of capital and of the associated construction of returns per unit of capital.) Thus, in a given market with x units of available insurance capital, the demand for insurance is χ(π(x) + ηE(ζ i )) = x, because the risk premium π(x) is positive and providers of insurance capital have no better use for their capital at that moment in time.
Markets a and b are assumed to have identically distributed preferences among their respective pools of buyers of protection, and thus have the same inverse-demand function π( · ). Their cumulative proportional claims processes L a and L b are identically distributed, but need not be independent. For example, some of the loss events could strike both markets.
While capital is deployed in insurance market i, it is subject to the cumulative proportional loss process L i and is re-invested over time in a financial asset with Lévy cumulative return process R i . Investment in this additional local asset is allowed merely for generality.
The total cumulative proportional accumulation process for capital in market i, before considering the movement of capital between the markets, is thus ρ i = −L i + R i , where ρ a and ρ b have the joint distribution described earlier for the general model. Given the characteristics (q, c, λ) of the intermediation of capital between the two markets, the primitives (π, ρ a , ρ b , r, q, c, λ) of our basic model are fixed.
B Verification of Optimality of HJB Solution
This appendix provides a proof that the HJB equation (22) characterizes optimality. For this, given an arbitrary intensity process λ, let
By Itô's Formula, a local martingale is defined bŷ
Because λ andV are bounded, this local martingale is in fact a martingale. From this and the implication of the HJB equation that
another application of Itô's formula implies that S is the sum of a decreasing process and a martingale. Thus, S is a supermartingale. BecauseV is bounded, we have the "transversality" condition that for any intermediation intensity process λ, (10) is satisfied. For the case λ = λ * , the fact that
implies that S is a martingale. This in turn implies (11) and the optimality result.
C Valuation of Search Fees
This appendix demonstrates the calculation (16) of the present value P T (1, 0) of search fees that was used in the text, in the case of no recovery at loss events.
Homogeneity implies that this present value returns to the same level at each loss event, so
where p is the present value of search costs until the next catastrophe and τ is the time until the first to arrive of the loss events in the two markets, which is exponentially distributed with parameter 2η. Starting with X 0 = 1 and Y 0 = 0, we have
This yields X t = e −λt and Y t = 1 − e −λt , for t < τ . The intermediary will stop searching at that time a(T ) at which Z a(T ) = T , so
This yields
The present value of search costs until the next loss event is
Because τ is exponentially distributed with parameter 2η,
Substitution of these into (31) yields the result (16).
D Proof of Proposition 3
That v is bounded follows from the fact that it is dominated by 2/r. The monotonicity result is based on two intermediate lemmas.
First, given the function f determining intermediation fees, let
The first term of κ(z) is the present value of switching capital to the under-capitalized market if the intermediary arrests intermediation efforts from the point at which the capital ratio Z t is at z until the next loss event occurs, given g 0 . Suppose in particular, a given reduced policy L(z) = Λ(z, 1), and a particular z at which L(z) = 0. Then κ(z) = 0.
As a special case, κ(1) = 0 (which can also be checked directly from the definition of κ and the fact that f (1) = 0). We note that, since the first term defining κ is strictly increasing in z, κ ′ (z) must be positive whenever f ′ (z) is negative. Given a policy L, we will show that κ is nonnegative. In order to see this, we observe that for z ≥ 1, (13) can be re-written as
We already know that κ(1) = 0. Since f is positive from Proposition 2, this implies that f ′ (z) is negative whenever κ(z) ≤ 0, and hence that κ ′ > 0 whenever κ ≤ 0. Therefore, κ cannot cross 0 from above, which proves our first lemma.
Lemma 1 For any policy, κ is everywhere nonnegative.
This result is intuitive: other things equal, the expected gain from moving one's capital is larger if the intermediary immediately stops switching capital after that last movement, since the difference between capital levels, and hence between premia, is larger in that case. Lemma 1 has a crucial consequence for the case γ = 1: the rate at which fees are paid to the intermediary when he searches is strictly increasing in z. The more heterogeneous the markets, the higher is the intermediary's immediate profit from switching. Since this rate of fee payment, net of search costs, is qzf (z) − c, we must show that zf (z) is strictly increasing in z. We can re-write (32) when γ = 1 as
Since f is positive and κ is nonnegative, this implies that f (z)+zf ′ (z) is positive whenever L(z) > 0, hence that zf (z) is strictly increasing in z. On any interval on which L(z) = 0, we have f (z) = (1 + ηg 0 )/(r + 2η)(1 − 1/z), so f is strictly increasing, and, a fortiori, so is zf (z).
Lemma 2 For γ = 1 and any policy, the revenue rate zf (z) is strictly increasing in z.
We can now show monotonicity of v for any trigger policy. From (23), v is constant for z ≤ S. Starting with some capital ratio Z 0 = z > S,
where τ is the time of the next loss event. The function z → [qf (z)z − c]1 z>S is nondecreasing in z from Lemma 2, and strictly increasing for z > S. For S < z < z ′ , this implies that v(z) < v(z ′ ) (because the event time τ has a distribution that does not depend on z or z ′ ). This proves Proposition 3.
E Optimality of a Trigger Policy
This appendix shows that for any equilibrium pair (f, L), the reduced policy function L must be a trigger policy. In fact, we will show that for any switching-gain function f that can arise as the result of an admissible intermediation policy, equilibrium or otherwise, the optimal policy must be of the trigger form.
From Appendix B, we know that, for a given f , any bounded solution of the HJB equation yields an optimal policy. We also know that f is continuous (and, in fact, differentiable) from (21). From Lemma 2, we also know that for any admissible policy, zf (z) must be increasing. Finally f must be such that the value function v is bounded by 2/r. These conditions define what we call "admissibility" of f . In particular, these conditions must be satisfied in any equilibrium.
We first show that there exists a solution to the HJB equation that is achieved by a trigger policy. Then we verify that any policy that achieves the value function that solves the HJB equation must be of the trigger form.
For any equilibrium, the function f is bounded, because
Therefore, given any candidates for the capital trigger ratio T and the constant v 1 , one can integrate the HJB equation (24) 
where β(z) =λ(qzf (z) − c)/(r + 2η) and α =λ/(r + 2η) > 0 is positive on (T, ∞). Proposition 7 Suppose that the payout-rate function π is of the form π(x) = a + k/x,.
Then any equilibrium intermediation policy Λ corresponds to a trigger capital ratio T .
That is Λ(x, y) =λ1 {x/y > T } .
F Existence of Equilibrium
So far, we have shown that any equilibrium must be of the trigger form. In this appendix we show that there exists such an equilibrium. Appendix G shows uniqueness of such equilibria.
For any candidate trigger capital ratio T , let f (z | T ) be the net expected gain from switching capital across markets under the policy with trigger T , given current market heterogeneity z. We need to show that there exists some T such that qT f (T | T ) = c, that is, such that the intermediary ceases intermediation, given the switching gain function Because zf (z) is increasing, equation (20) implies that
This implies that T f (T | T ) ≥ (T − 1)/(r + 2η). We note that the lower bound grows linearly with T . Because T f (T | T ) = 0 for T = 1, we know that T → T f (T | T ) goes from 0 to ∞ as T goes from 0 to ∞. This function is continuous, so there exists some
Proposition 8 Suppose that the payout-rate function π is of the form π(x) = a + k/x.
Then, there exists an equilibrium with a trigger policy.
G Proof of Uniqueness of Trigger
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that trigger levels S and T , S < T , both satisfy the equations of the proposition. Let we use superscripts to denote dependence on S or T .) From (26), S < T implies that
Optimality of S (respectively T ) with respect to f S (respectively, f T ) implies that, for any z in (S, T ],
we know that φ(T ) < 0. Subtracting the version of equation (18) for T from the version of the same equation for S yields
Because φ(T ) < 0, this 9 implies that φ < 0 for z > T , so that φ is everywhere negative.
By definition, g 0 is the marginal value of capital held by investors in the overcapitalized market, when x = 1 and y = 0 (that is, when no investor is initially present in the small market). Therefore,
where Φ 0 is the expected discounted value of all future fees that speculators will pay to the intermediary. (Recall that 2/r is the expected discounted stream of dividends paid on both market; see the "conservation equation" (17).) We have seen that φ < 0, that is,
This means that investors pay, for any z, more fees with S than with T for z > T . Moreover, for z ∈ [S, T ], investors pay fees (which are positive, from Proposition 2) for trigger S, whereas they pay nothing for trigger T . Therefore,
H Algorithm for Trigger Calculation
In general, (26) provides the following fixed-point algorithm for computing the equilibrium trigger capital ratio T .
1. Start with some candidate value for v 0 , which we call v 0 . From (17) and (26) 4. These steps are iterated until a fixed point is reached.
We have considered methods for speeding up the computation.
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I HJB Analysis with Partial Recovery
In this appendix, we analyze the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the case of general proportional losses.
Letting Φ( · ) denote the cumulative recovery-rate distribution function associated with the fractional event loss measure ν. That is,
and h(z) = H(z, 1) satisfy the coupled equations
As opposed to the case of total loss, these equations cannot be combined to yield a single equation for f = h − g, because of differing integrands.
Letting v(z) = V (z, 1), the 0-homogeneity of V implies that the value after a loss event is v(uz) if ux ≥ y, v(1/uz) if ux ≤ y, and v(z/u) if the loss occurs on the smaller 10 One can prove that v ′ ∼ log(z)/z 2 as z goes to ∞. Unfortunately, this convergence rate is not particularly fast.
A possibility is to integrate v numerically up to some valueẑ above which non-dominant terms in (25) are neglected.
Aboveẑ, the simplified equation becomes 2z
2 , which can be integrated to yield v(z) − v(ẑ) in closed form (up to the simplification of the equation).
market. The HJB equation is thus 0 = sup
The equation reduces to
The smooth-pasting condition, as for the case of no recovery at loss events, is
J Algorithm for Partial Recovery Model
This appendix includes an algorithm for solving the partial-recovery equations of the previous appendix. The algorithm exploits the linearity of the differential equations for g, h, and v, which arise thanks to the special structure of our problem.
J.1 Primitives
The parameters are r, η, λ, q, c, and the recover rate distribution function Φ :
, a beta distribution with parameters ν and ω. The algorithm will determine the trigger level T for intermediation and the value functions g, h, and v.
J.2 Strategy
We use the following fixed-point algorithm. Start with a value of T , then iterate the following steps:
1. Numerically evaluate g and h (which are independent of the rest of the system, given T ).
2. Numerically evaluate v (which depends on T , g and h).
3. Use (40) to obtain a new value of T .
4. Stop if the last iteration is such that the new value of T is close enough to the value of T at the beginning of the loop. Otherwise, return to the first step.
Separate analysis shows that the solution T lies in 1 ≤ T ≤ 1 + c(r + 2η)/q which bounds the starting value.
The remaining subsections provide guidelines for the realization of each step. Except for the last subsection, the value of T is fixed.
J.3 A system of equations for g and h
We first discretize the equations for g and h to obtain a linear system of equations of the form Ax = b.
The variable z ∈ [1, ∞) is discretized: we use a grid G with n + 1 points such that z i = δ i , i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, where δ > 1 is fixed. Such a grid is finer near 1, where T is more likely to be found. Considering other grids does not affect the equations below.
To each z i corresponds two rows of the matrix A, which is (2n + 2) × (2n + 2). The vector x = [g, h] corresponds to the discretized values of the unknown functions g and
In what follows, g = (g 0 , . . . , g n ) and h = (h 0 , . . . , h n ) are vectors approximating the functions, and x is the concatenation of these vectors.
For any condition C let 1 C denote the function equal to 1 if C is true and 0 otherwise.
For z and T in G, we let λ(z, T ) = λ1 z>T . Thus, λ = λ if z > T and 0 otherwise.
J.4 Discretization conventions
For any 0 ≤ u < u ′ ≤ 1, we let K(u, u ′ ) = Φ(u ′ ) − Φ(u) denote the probability that the recovery rate is between u and u ′ , according to the stipulated beta distribution. For each
clear from the above. We can decompose A into four (n + 1) × (n + 1) submatrices as
The coefficients of these submatrices are determined by the previous discretized equations.
We have
The coefficients of the matrices C, D, and E can be obtained similarly.
Once A is computed, we solve the system A[g; h] = b. This yields the vector of candidate values for g and h that is needed in the next step of the algorithm.
For n = 100, the system can easily be solved by any reasonable computation package, as long as A is invertible. Usual algorithms proceed by factorization of A and direct computation of the solution by pivot methods, which are faster and more robust than inversion of A.
J.7 Computation of v
We discretize the equation for v similarly, using the candidate values of g and h obtained in the previous step. The goal of this subsection is to determine the coefficients of the matrix F and a vector d defining the system F v = d, where v ∈ R n+1 + is the discretization vector of the function v, F is a (n + 1) × (n + 1) square matrix, and d is an (n + 1)-dimensional vector.
The discretized equation for v = (v 0 , . . . , v n ) yields for i ∈ {0, . . . n}, keeping the same notational scheme used before and letting v −1 = v 0 and v n+1 = v n ,
Therefore, the right-hand side of the linear system is
The coefficients F are determined as were those of A.
J.8 New Value of T
The last step of the loop of the fixed-point algorithm is the determination of a new candidate trigger level of T . Discretizing (40) yields the condition, for T = z t
(1 + z t )z t v t+1 − v t−1 z t+1 − z t−1 = qz t (h t − g t ) − c.
The new candidate value of T is thus the element of the grid G whose corresponding index t is the closest to satisfying the above equation.
K Diffusion Risk
In this appendix, we allow invested capital to be exposed to diffusive reinvestment risk.
Specifically, we suppose that the Lévy process ρ i driving proportional capital changes in market i is the sum of a Brownian motion ζ i and an independent compound Poisson process. The value function retains the same degree of homogeneity found in the main text.
With perfect correlation between the Brownian sources of risk in the two markets, ζ a and ζ b , the analysis is identical to that shown in the main text.
More generally, suppose that the Brownian motions ζ a and ζ b have volatility parameter σ and correlation parameter R. In the remainder of this appendix, we derive the characterizing equations for G and H, then g and h.
To clarify computations with diffusion terms, we temporarily consider investor wealth.
LetG(x, y, α) andH(x, y, α) denote the present value of having α units of capital initially in the large and small markets, respectively. Of course,G(x, y, α) = αG(x, y), where G(x, y) =G(x, y, 1). Similarly,H(x, y, α) = H(x, y), where H(x, y) =H(x, y, 1). We first provide equations forG andH, and then use those to derive equations for G and H.
We assume, to begin, zero recovery. As before, we can take the drift rate µ to be zero without loss of generality. We have − rG(x, y, α) + απ(x) −G x (x, y, α)xΛ(x, y) +G y (x, y, α)xΛ(x, y) + σ 2 [xyRH xy (x, y, α) + xαRH xα (x, y, α) + yαH yα (x, y, α)] = 0, (45) where we used the fact that, when the investor is in market x, the correlation between x and α is 1, and the correlation between y and α is R. The symmetric correlations apply when the investor is in market y.
Using the fact thatG α (x, y, 1) = G(x, y),G αα (x, y, 1) = 0,G xα (x, y, 1) = G x (x, y), andG yα (x, y, 1) = G y (x, y), with identical relations betweenH, H, and their derivatives, we get the following equations for G and H (letting α = 1 in the previous equations):
− rG(x, y) + π(x) − G x (x, y)xΛ(x, y) + G y (x, y)xΛ(x, y) 
L Connectedness
In this appendix, we outline a model with the natural feature that an investor is increasingly likely to be in contact with multiple intermediaries at the point of bargaining as the total number of intermediaries is increased.
Suppose that there is an advertising medium handling intermediary ads. An intermediary's effort corresponds to the probability p that its advertisement will place the intermediary in contact with an investor at the time at which the investor checks the medium. We assume that p is bounded by some capacity constraintp < 1. Each investor, pairwise independently across investors, has some exogenous intensity χ for the times of observing the advertising medium. This is consistent with the framework of our main model: The intensity of times at which an investor is contacted by least one intermediary is χφ n (p), where
Then, λ = χφ n (p) is the intermediation capacity parameter of the basic model. Assuming that a well-connected investor initiates bargaining with a randomly selected intermediary from among those contacted, each intermediary has maximal contact intensity λ/n. The probability that, when in contact with an intermediary, an investor is in contact with at least two intermediaries is
For a fixed φ ∈ [0, 1], letp n solve φ n (p n ) = φ, so thatλ is independent of n, as in our basic model. One may easily check thatp n is decreasing in n. Moreover, using that ψ n (p n ) =φ − np n (1 − p n ) n−1 =φ − (1 −φ)np n 1 − p n , one can show that ψ n (p n ) is increasing in n. 11 Therefore, keeping constant the flow of investors being contacted at any given time, the average number of intermediaries in contact with any given investor is increasing in n. As the number of intermediaries goes to infinity, the probability that investor is well connected is: lim n→∞ ψ n (p n ) =φ + (1 −φ) log(1 −φ).
The second term is negative. This specification can be generalized to an arbitrary number of media, with the same result that ψ n is increasing in n.
11 In order to verify this, one is to show that np n /(1 − p n ) is decreasing. Expressing p n in terms of α = (1 −φ) −1 > 1 and letting x = 1/n, this is equivalent to showing that (α x − 1)/x is increasing in x. This is easily done by checking the positivity of the derivative, which is increasing in u = α x and vanishes for u = 1.
